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PRESS ADVOCACY AND THE HIGH-
PROFILE CLIENT
Robert S. Bennett*
With rare exception, it is best when the media ignore a client's
problems. However, when representing a high-profile client, most
often the issue is not whether an attorney deals with reporters, but
only how that attorney deals with them.
In practice I often find my clients in what can best be de-
scribed as a "Bermuda Triangle"-the cross-currents and winds
generated by a criminal investigation, the media, and Congress. If
not navigated carefully, the result can be the humiliation of indi-
viduals and their families, and the destruction of businesses and
careers.
Representing a high-profile client caught in this Bermuda Tri-
angle almost always requires the lawyer to engage in aggressive
press advocacy not called for in a traditional case. One must en-
gage in such advocacy because the client's reputation, which is of-
ten of primary importance, is at stake. A business executive or
political leader who has built a reputation for honesty and integrity
over many years often considers this aspect of legal representation
every bit as important as the more traditional legal defense func-
tions.
In political and other high-profile cases, effective press advo-
cacy can help neutralize the forces that encourage a prosecutor to
initiate a criminal investigation. And if an investigation is initi-
ated, effective press advocacy can create a climate in which a
prosecutor, particularly an elected one, will not be pressured by
constituents to indict, or, if an indictment is returned, a jury will
not be disposed to convict.
Prior to Watergate, when I was a young prosecutor, the media
did not have the impact on the law enforcement process that it has
* Robert S. Bennett, a former federal prosecutor and a member of the defense
bar since 1971, heads Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom's international criminal
enforcement group. He also leads the civil and criminal enforcement practice of
Skadden, Arps' Washington, D.C., office.
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today. Except for the occasional case, most media coverage was
limited to reporting what occurred at trial. Things are far different
today. We live in an era where prosecutors use journalists to pub-
licize their ongoing investigations, while journalists, through their
news stories, can generate public and congressional demands for
investigations and indictments from prosecutors. Many criminal
prosecutions, particularly in political and business crime cases, are
born in the pages of newspapers where investigative reporters,
seeking to be the Woodwards and Bernsteins of their day, print
titillating allegations, and where government agents who dislike
the plea bargains struck by lawyers, leak information to the press
in the hope that public attention will kill the deal.
Congress compounds the problem. Members and their staffs
view splashy public hearings as vehicles to enhance national repu-
tations, impress hometown constituents, and discredit political op-
ponents. As political power changes hands, it becomes "get even
time." Under the guise of legislative oversight, these hearings are
little more than efficient tools to humiliate and destroy one's op-
ponents publicly, either directly or by attacking friends and col-
leagues who are unfortunate pawns in a grander political scheme.
I use the word "efficient" because those who conduct these parti-
san investigations are not burdened with the time consuming task
of obtaining the facts before reaching conclusions.
The recent hearings of the Senate Whitewater Committee and
the House Government Operations Committee provide archetypal
examples. Both are highly politicized, and the conclusions reached
by the committees have little to do with the evidence before them
and everything to do with politics. How else does one explain that
virtually all conclusions and interpretations of evidence divide
along party lines? Yet these congressional investigations are pre-
sented to the public as quasi-judicial proceedings clothed in the
trappings of a criminal trial-complete with hired prosecutors. A
congressional hearing is a forum, however, where the rules of evi-
dence do not apply and where witnesses have none of the consti-
tutional rights and V rotections available to defendants in real
criminal proceedings.
Moreover, once Congress obtains otherwise confidential
documents, control is lost, and they are invariably released to the
media, to the client's detriment. Whether it be a leak, or simply a
1. See United States v. Deutch, 147 F. Supp. 89, 92 (D.D.C. 1956).
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committee chairperson abusing the power to release committee
records to the public, the damage is done unless the client re-
sponds promptly, through his lawyer. For these reasons, represent-
ing clients in criminal cases involving concurrent congressional in-
vestigations, or in criminal cases that are generated by
congressional inquiries, requires special skills beyond those usually
employed in the courtroom, and these include dealing with the
media.
The Independent Counsel statute2 has further institutionalized
a role for Congress in the criminal law process. Traditionally,
prosecutors respond to crimes that already have occurred and are
known. Independent counsel, by contrast, on a minimum of evi-
dence, are given a wide-ranging mandate to find a crime. They are
virtually unaccountable both as to what they do and how much
they spend. Beware of the lawyer with one case and a deep
pocket. As Justice Scalia said in his dissenting opinion in Morrison
v. Olson:
How frightening it must be to have your own independent
counsel and staff appointed, with nothing else to do but to
investigate you until investigation is no longer worthwhile
.... And to have that counsel and staff decide, with no
basis for comparison, whether what you have done is bad
enough, willful enough, and provable enough, to warrant
an indictment. How admirable the constitutional system-
that provides the means to avoid such a distortion. And
how unfortunate the judicial decision that has permittedi.3
it.,
It is a reflection of our times that many independent counsel
have their own press spokesperson to deal with the news media
who, in turn, carefully track the distorted process engaged in by
independent counsel. One of my clients, former Secretary of De-
fense Caspar Weinberger, was victimized by an independent coun-
sel who used the media to justify his investigation-an investiga-
tion long in tenure but short in results. Indeed, in June 1992, only
days after a five-count indictment was returned against Wein-
berger, the independent counsel appeared on the television pro-
gram Nightline. During that appearance, Lawrence Walsh ex-
plained how "as long as [his office] continue[s] to work up toward
2. 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 (1995).
3. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654,732 (1988) (Scalia, J. dissenting).
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the center of responsibility, it's very difficult to give a good reason
for stopping [the investigation of Iran-Contra]."
After we successfully moved to dismiss a key part of that in-
dictment, the independent counsel, fully aware of the media feed-
ing frenzy that would result, returned a second indictment that at-
tempted to repackage the dismissed charge against Weinberger.
He did this only days before the 1992 presidential election, and the
new indictment unnecessarily included specific, inculpatory refer-
ences to then-President Bush. Predictably, this caused front-page
headlines and lead television news stories focusing on Iran-Contra
in the final days of the campaign, at a time when Weinberger stood
indicted but not yet tried. We successfully argued that the new
charge should be dismissed as having been filed beyond the statute
of limitations, but the impact of the news coverage was irreversi-
ble.
In representing Weinberger, therefore, one of the most deli-
cate yet important tasks we had was to communicate to the public,
including politicians and the press, that he was being abused by an
overly zealous prosecutor. In particular, I determined that it was
important to take advantage of the independent counsel's missteps
by showing that this second indictment-and its politically damag-
ing language-was not a legal necessity, but that it was either, at its
most benign, a media strategy to hype the case, or at worst, a cal-
culated effort to cause political damage to President Bush.
Had we not been able to do this, we might not have succeeded
in obtaining a pardon for Weinberger. President Bush, who ap-
preciated the unfairness of the actions of the independent counsel,
did the right and honorable thing by pardoning him, and the public
accepted the pardon with little criticism. This public acceptance
was largely the result of their recognition that Weinberger should
not have been charged. This was accomplished, in part, by ag-
gressive press advocacy in response to the independent counsel's
public statements.
A further example of this unfair conduct-arguably permitted
by the Independent Counsel statute-was Walsh's final report to
Congress. This public report attempted to justify the independent
counsel's almost seven-year investigation and failed prosecutions.
The special division of the court overseeing the independent coun-




sel was highly critical, finding that the report:
[R]epeatedly accuses named individuals of crimes, al-
though in many instances the individual was never in-
dicted, if indicted was never convicted, or if convicted the
conviction was reversed. These accusations include
charges that named individuals were guilty of a conspir-
acy charged in a count that was dismissed before trial,
that various named public officials engaged in efforts to
obstruct justice, where such individuals were never in-
dicted, let alone convicted, and instances in which the
Report charges that individuals were "factually guilty"
even though the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit had reversed the only con-
viction relevant to the charge under discussion
A case does not have to be brought by an independent coun-
sel, however, for there to be prosecutorial abuse of the media. In
another recent high-profile matter, our firm represented Clark
Clifford and Robert Altman in connection with the New York Dis-
trict Attorney's grand jury investigation and subsequent prosecu-
tion of allegations that the Bank of Credit and Commerce Inter-
national (BCCI) unlawfully gained control and ownership over
First American Bankshares, a domestic multistate banking institu-
tion on the East Coast.6 Needless to say, this was a controversial
case upon which the media expended tremendous resources.
When put to the test, however, the prosecution had no case. Clif-
ford was never tried and Altman was acquitted.
Never before in my thirty years as a lawyer have I witnessed
such blatant use of the media by a prosecuting authority as oc-
curred in this case, both prior to the indictment and during trial.
At every phase, the New York District Attorney's Office used the
media to tout its own actions and foster public support for allega-
tions against Clifford and Altman. For example, in April 1992,
two months prior to the indictment, the district attorney and his
staff were interviewed and posed for pictures for an article a~pear-
ing in that well-known legal journal, Vanity Fair magazine. The
article, entitled, "How They Broke the Bank," addressed the dis-
trict attorney's investigation and indictment of BCCI, and the
5. In re North, 16 F.3d 1234,1237-38 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
6. People v. Abedi, 595 N.Y.S.2d 1011 (Sup. Ct. 1993).
7. Marie Brenner, How They Broke the Bank, VANITY FAIR, Apr. 1992, at 168.
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continuing grand jury investigation of Clifford and Altman.!
Amazingly, the district attorney's staff provided, in graphic and
unflattering terms, information that occurred in confidential
meetings with our clients.9
Even as the prosecution was closing its case, members of the
district attorney's staff spoke with a reporter for New York Maga-
zine, a publication that enjoys widespread dissemination through-
out the city. The following was reported:
Prosecutors say that they have proved their case, and that
Altman will be convicted.... "We're sure about most ju-
rors," says one [prosecutor]. "But there are one or two
who just may not be getting it." Other officials in Mor-
genthau's office have begun to talk of fallback possibili-
ties. Among them: that the U.S. Justice Department will
revive its own case against Altman if the state's case
fails."°
Keep in mind that these statements were made at a critical
juncture of the trial and that the jury was not sequestered. The
prosecutors stated opinions as to the strength of their case and
their personal belief in the guilt of the defendant."1 These quotes
were intended to infect the jury and salvage what was clearly a
dying prosecution.
It is obvious from conduct such as this that criminal defen-
dants cannot rely on rules of ethics to protect them from media
abuse by prosecutors. '2 The rules have little teeth and require af-
ter-the-fact enforcement actions that are no help to cure damage
done in mid-trial. Lawyers who represent clients in high-profile
cases involving public figures must, where appropriate-and, I
must emphasize, always consistent with the canons of ethics and
the rules of court-engage in their own press advocacy as part of
their defense on behalf of a client, just as we had no choice but to
respond to these unfair tactics by engaging in our own press advo-
cacy in Altman's case.
Indeed, courts recognize that it is the client's right to have a
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Christopher Byron, The Bottom Line: The Hard Case, N.Y. MAO., July 19,
1993, at 10.
11. Id.
12. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 3.8(g) (1995) (barring
prosecutors from making statements that increase the likelihood of greater public
condemnation of a defendant).
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lawyer vigorously defend the client's reputation in the public fo-
rum and to neutralize the media-generated pressures, which can
lead to an indictment and conviction. In reversing a district court
pretrial gag order imposed against lawyers for Congressman Ford,
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals explained that:
He is entitled to fight the obvious damage to his political
reputation in the press and in the court of public opinion,
as well as in the courtroom and on the floor of Congress.
He will soon be up for reelection. His opponents will at-
tack him as an indicted felon. He will be unable to re-
spond in kind if the District Court's order remains in
place. He will be unable to inform his constituents of his
point of view. And reciprocally, . . . this issue of un-
doubted public importance.
3
Even ultimate acquittal is insufficient to restore an individ-
ual's reputation; once lost, it is gone. Several years ago former
Secretary of Labor Raymond Donovan, upon being acquitted after
a lengthy trial-which itself had followed a lengthy special counsel
investigation-asked the assembled press, "which office do I go to
get my reputation back?, 14 The lawyer, therefore, not only has a
right, but indeed an obligation, to advocate for his or her client
outside the courtroom.15
In Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada,16 Supreme Court Justice
Kennedy eloquently stated:
An attorney's duties do not begin inside the courtroom
door. He or she cannot ignore the practical implications
of a legal proceeding for the client. Just as an attorney
may recommend a plea bargain or civil settlement to
avoid the adverse consequences of a possible loss after
trial, so too an attorney may take reasonable steps to de-
fend a client's reputation and reduce the adverse conse-
quences of indictment, especially in the face of a prosecu-
tion deemed unjust or commenced with improper
motives. A defense attorney may pursue lawful strategies
13. United States v. Ford, 830 F.2d 596, 601 (6th Cir. 1987).
14. Elkan Abramowitz, Cases Against Politicians: A History of Failed Prosecu-
tions, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 3, 1995, at 3.
15. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6(c) (1995)
(permitting defense counsel, in the appropriate case, to take steps to mitigate ad-
verse publicity).
16. 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
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to obtain dismissal of an indictment or reduction of
charges, including an attempt to demonstrate in the court
of public opinion that the client does not deserve to be
tried."
I agree. Sometimes the only way to navigate your client out of
the Bermuda Triangle is to throw overboard the traditional "no
comment" and vigorously advocate your client's cause in the court
of public opinion.
17. Id. at 1043.
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